Incomplete markets and monetary policy by Gourdel, Pascal & Triki, Leila
Incomplete markets and monetary policy
Pascal Gourdel, Leila Triki
To cite this version:
Pascal Gourdel, Leila Triki. Incomplete markets and monetary policy. Cahiers de la Maison
des Sciences Economiques 2005.24 - ISSN : 1624-0340. 2005. <halshs-00193970>
HAL Id: halshs-00193970
https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00193970
Submitted on 5 Dec 2007
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destine´e au de´poˆt et a` la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publie´s ou non,
e´manant des e´tablissements d’enseignement et de
recherche franc¸ais ou e´trangers, des laboratoires
publics ou prive´s.
Maison des Sciences Économiques, 106-112 boulevard de L'Hôpital, 75647  Paris Cedex 13
http://mse.univ-paris1.fr/Publicat.htm
ISSN : 1624-0340
UMR CNRS 8095
       
Incomplete markets and monetary policy
Pascal GOURDEL, CERMSEM
Leila TRIKI, CERMSEM
2005.24
INCOMPLETE MARKETS AND MONETARY POLICY
P. GOURDEL AND L. TRIKI
We consider an extension of a general equilibrium model with incomplete markets that consid-
ers cash-in-advance constraints. The total amount of money is supplied by an authority, which
produces at no cost and lends money to agents at short term nominal rates of interest, meeting
the demand. Agents have initial nominal claims, which in the aggregate, are the counterpart
of an initial public debt. The authority covers its expenditures, including initial debt, through
public revenues which consists of taxes and seignorage, and distributes its eventual budget sur-
pluses through transfers to individuals, while no further instruments are available to correct
eventual budget deficits. We define a concept of equilibrium in this extended model, and prove
that there exists a monetary equilibrium with no transfers. Moreover, we show that if the price
level is high enough, a monetary equilibrium with transfers exists.
Keywords: Cash-in-advance constraints, incomplete markets, nominal assets, monetary equi-
librium, money, nominal interest rate
JEL Classification: C62, D52, E40, E50, G10.
1. Introduction
In the canonical general equilibrium model, all trade takes place in a barter economy, pre-
cluding the role of money as a medium of exchange. In 1965, Frank Hahn [10] has argued that
it was difficult to justify a positive price for fiat money (i.e. paper money) (this is known as the
“Hahn Paradox”) which stipulates by a backward induction reasoning in a finite-period econ-
omy that money cannot have positive value. As discussed by Dubey–Geanakoplos [5], there are
several ways to overcome this paradox. Among them, one can consider an infinite-horizon model
(Samuelson [15], Grandmont–Younes [9]), and in these cases, money has value because it is a
store of value. Another way to overcome Hahn’s Paradox is to introduce an external agent, who
stands ready to trade commodities for money (Lucas [13], Magill–Quinzii [14]). Alternatively,
following Lerner [11], one could postulate the existence of a government that is owed in taxes. In
these two latter cases, money has value because an external agent gives something in exchange
for it.
The present paper considers the presence of an external agent, an authority, and the theoret-
ical work underlying it, Dre`ze–Polemarchakis [4], [3], consists in formulating an intertemporal
general equilibrium model with money, introducing reasonable assumptions that guarantee the
existence of equilibria in this extended model. In order to define a general competitive equilibria
in a monetary economy, we modify the canonical Walrasian model by introducing an incom-
plete financial market and money balances that facilitate transactions. Fiat money produced at
Cermsem, Universite´ Paris-I Panthe´on Sorbonne, 106-112 boulevard de l’Hoˆpital, 75647 Paris Cedex 13, France.
We are very gratefull to Professors Dre`ze J.J., Polemarchakis H. and to Florenzano M. for very helpfull comments
.
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no cost by banks serves as medium of exchange. An authority lends money to agents against
promise of reimbursement with interest rate, or equivalently, in exchange for interest bearing
bonds. All initial holdings of money are the counterparts of debts to banks. In the monetary
vocabulary of monetary economies, this is a model of “inside money”1. It is a model appropriate
for economies where an authority issues money in exchange for offsetting claims. There is no
default, and the authority raises revenue from taxes and seignorage. It distributes its eventual
surpluses as lump-sum transfers to agents. The demand for money at given commodity prices
and interest rates results from the preference maximizing choice of individuals. As store of
value, non-interest-bearing fiat money is dominated by interest-bearing nominal assets. Bal-
ances, prices and rates of interests do not enter as arguments of preferences of the agents.
Over a finite horizon with no public debt, and no taxes, Dre`ze and Polemarchakis [3] proved
the existence of equilibria for arbitrarily set nominal rates of interest and price levels at all
terminal nodes. In a recent joint paper with Bloize [1], they proved the existence over an infinite
horizon economy under uncertainty and complete asset markets. The primitive of the model
include nominal claims held by individuals (that in the aggregate are the counterpart of initial
public debt). Their work extends for Woodford [17] in the case of heterogeneous agents, which
is in term similar to cash-in-advance economies with a representative agent as in Lucas–Stockey
[12]. Woodford [17] asserts that the price level is determinate so as to balance the initial public
debt and public revenu from taxes and seignorage. Similarly, Dubey–Geanakoplos [6] obtain
deterministic equilibria considering the case of a given initial shock of outside money. On the
other hand, Bloize–Dre`ze–Polemarchakis [1] obtain indeterminacy of equilibria since they as-
sume that the public authority can redistribute its eventual surpluses.
In this paper, we propose an extension of Bloize–Dre`ze–Polemarchakis [1], in an incomplete
market setting, and over a finite, two-period horizon. The main results are:
• The existence of a monetary equilibrium with no transfers, under reasonnable assump-
tions.
• The existence of a monetary equilibrium above a lower bound of the overall price level,
when the authority faces a budget surplus. Two alternative assumptions on the public
portfolio (the portfolio that the authority supplies) are proposed and the results are
compared.
The paper is organized as follows: we begin by introducing the primitive of the model, as well
as the time and uncertainty setup (Section 2). We also define an appropriate notion of monetary
equilibria, and state the assumptions under which existence will be proved. Section 3 proves the
existence of equilibria with no transfers. Finally, Section 4 proves existence when the authority
faces a budget surpluses.
2. A 2-Period Monetary Economy
We consider a finite set I of agents, two periods t = 0 and t = 1 with a finite set S of states
of the world at the second period. We denote Σ = {0} ∪ S, where 0 is the state of the world
known with certainty at t = 0. The state of the world σ ∈ Σ is called a date-event state. There
1Several authors have studied the implications of integrating outside money in a general equilibrium model
with incomplete markets. Main contributions are Dubey–Geanakoplos [6].
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is a finite set of goods L available for trades at both periods, a finite set J of 1-period maturity
nominal assets that agents can buy at t = 0 and which yield monetary returns at t = 1.
We denote by y• the family:
y• = (yi, i ∈ I)
• The commodity market Ec is described by Ec = (X•, u•, e•, g•, ξ•) where, for each agent
i ∈ I, Xi ⊂ RLΣ+ is the consumption set of agent i. A vector xi ∈ Xi is a consumption
plan. The utility function ui : Xi −→ R describes the preferences of agent i ∈ I. The
initial endowments are given by ei ∈ RLΣ+ and every agent i pays taxes gi ∈ RLΣ+ to the
authority. Notice that in particular, it can be assumed that gi = ηiei, for some 0 6 ηi < 1
with η• > 0 being some tax rates across individuals. Our commodity taxes then reduce
to a wealth tax. The public authority also issues transfers t which are elements of RΣ.
These transfers are distributed to individuals according to given shares ξi ∈]0, 1[ such
that
∑
i∈I ξ
i = 1 and each agent receives the amount ξit.
• The financial market Ef is described by Ef = (R,Θ•, θ) where R ∈ RS×J is the return
matrix, J 6 S, and for every (s, j) ∈ S × J , R(s, j) ∈ R is denominated in units of
account. For each agent i ∈ I, Θi ⊂ RJ is the portfolio set of agent i. Given an agent
i ∈ I and a portfolio θi ∈ Θi, (R(σ)θi, σ ∈ Σ) ∈ RΣ denotes the image of θi by R.
Finally, the portfolio θ ∈ RJ is the total amount of each asset available for trade, fixed
by the authority.
• The money market is described by Em = (w•, r) where w• ∈ RΣI and for each i ∈ I,
wi(0) ∈ R+ are initial individual nominal claims against the authority (corresponding
to the public debt). For convenience, we introduce the following notation: for every
agent i ∈ I, wi = (wi(σ), σ ∈ Σ) where wi(s) = 0, and for all states s ∈ S. We
setw =
∑
i∈I w
i. Short term nominal rates of interest r are positive element of RΣ
exogenously given.
Finally, a monetary economy is the triplet
E = (Ec, Ef , Em).
2.1. The transactions demand for money. Let us begin by introducing these notations: Let
p ∈ RLΣ+ the commodity price vector. We define the payoff matrix V ∈ RΣ×J by V = (−q R).
This operator summarizes the financial structure of the economy, given that q ∈ RJ is the asset
price vector. Let an agent i ∈ I. We denote net trades by zi = (xi − ei), where xi ∈ Xi and ei
initial endowments, zi+ = (x
i − ei)+ net purchases, zi− = (xi − ei)− net sales2. We will denote
by m̂i ∈ RΣ+ initial money balance, and by mi ∈ RΣ+ terminal money balance.
An important modeling choice concerns the treatment of time. There are two periods. For-
mally, a date is a point of time. For purpose of interpretation, the length of time period is
thought as non-trivial. Precise timing of transactions does not affect preferences while it does
affect money balances and accounting. Taking this into account, we follow the convention that
budget constraints will be written at beginning-of-period, given a path of interest rate r ∈ RΣ
2For a scalar, z+ = max {z, 0} and z− = max {−z, 0}; for a vector, z+ = (. . . , zk+, . . . ) and z− =
(. . . , zk−, . . . ). Notice that z = z+ − z−. Moreover, recall that the functions z −→ z+ and z −→ z− are
convex.
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and a vector h ∈ RΣ, we introduce, for every state σ ∈ Σ:
h˜(σ) =
1
1 + r(σ)
h(σ)(2.1)
Consider a date-event σ ∈ Σ. The transaction demand for money follows the scheme of cash-
in-advance constraints introduced by Clower [2]. An agent i ∈ I acquires cash balances m̂i(σ) by
borrowing initially from the authority in exchange for bonds at the rate of interest r(σ) ∈ R+,
according to the constraint
bi(σ) + m̂i(σ) = 0.
Subsequently, he purchases commodities according to the constraint:
p(σ) · zi+(σ) 6 m̂i(σ),(2.2)
He accumulates end-of-period balances from the sale of commodities according to the con-
straint
p(σ) · zi−(σ) = mi(σ),(2.3)
At the end of the period, or at the beginning of a subsequent, fictitious period that serves for
accounting purposes, the agent settles his debt according to the constraint:
(1 + r(σ))m̂i(σ) + p(σ) · gi(σ)− (V θi)(σ)− ξit(σ) 6 mi(σ) + (1 + r(σ))wi(σ)
where gi(σ) ∈ RL+ are commodity taxes payed to the authority, wi(σ) ∈ R+ are nominal initial
claims against the authority that agent receive at beginning-of-period, θi is the portfolio he
chooses to acquire, and ξit(σ) ∈ R is the amount of transfers that his share ξi allows him to
obtain. According to equations 2.2 and 2.3, the budget equation of agent i at date-event σ ∈ Σ
is summarized by:
(1 + r(σ))[p(σ) · zi+(σ)] + p(σ) · gi(σ) 6 p(σ) · zi−(σ) + (V θi)(σ) + ξit(σ) + (1 + r(σ))wi(σ)
p(σ) · [zi+(σ) + g˜i(σ)] 6
1
1 + r(σ)
(
p(σ) · zi−(σ)
)
+ (V˜ θi)(σ) + wi(σ) + ξit(σ)
p(σ) · (zi(σ) + g˜i(σ)) + p(σ) · zi−(σ) 6
1
1 + r(σ)
(
p(σ) · zi−(σ)
)
(V˜ θi)(σ) + wi(σ) + ξit˜(σ)
p(σ) · (zi(σ) + g˜i(σ)) + r(σ)
1 + r(σ)
p(σ) · zi−(σ) 6 (V˜ θi)(σ) + wi(σ) + ξit˜(σ)
For each commodity price p ∈ RΣL+ and each consumption plan x ∈ RΣL+ , we define the vector
px ∈ RΣ by
px = (p(σ) · x(σ), σ ∈ Σ) ∈ RΣ
where the operator · is the scalar product in RΣL.
For each interest rate r ∈ RΣ+ and each money balance m ∈ RΣ+, we define the vector r ◦m ∈ RΣ
by
r ◦m = (r(σ)m(σ), σ ∈ Σ) ∈ RΣ
We get to the overall budget constraints:
p (xi − ei + g˜i) + r˜ ◦ (p (xi − ei)−) 6 V˜ θi + wi + ξit˜.(2.4)
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2.2. Authority. The authority enters a date-event 0 with a given public liability w(0) and
covers this beginning-of-period expenditure and end-of-period supply of security θ ∈ RJ by
collecting commodity taxes g˜(0) ∈ RL+, given that money balances m(0) ∈ R+ are supplied so
as to accommodate the market demand, where
m(0) = r(0)p(0) ·
∑
i∈I
(
xi(0)− ei(0))−
At the end-of-period, the authority distributes its eventual budget surpluses as transfers to
individuals t(0) ∈ R determined by the beginning-of-period constraint:
t˜(0) = r˜(0)p(0) ·
∑
i∈I
(
xi(0)− ei(0))− + p(0) · g˜(0) + q˜ · θ − w(0)(2.5)
These transfers are distributed among agents according to their exogenous shares ξi ∈ [0, 1], and
vary accordingly to different consumption allocation x• ∈ RΣLI+ .
At date-event s ∈ S, given end-of-period returns of assets, and collected taxes g˜(σ) ∈ RL+ the
eventual budget surpluses distributed among agents amount to:
t˜(s) = r˜(s)p(s) ·
∑
i∈I
(
xi(s)− ei(s))− + p(s) · g˜(s)− (R˜θ)(s)(2.6)
The overall constraint faced by the authority sums up to:
t˜ = r˜ ◦p
∑
i∈I
(xi − ei)− + p g˜ − V˜ θ − w(2.7)
We can now go through the definition of an equilibrium and state the main result of the paper.
2.3. Definitions and notations. Given a commodity price vector p ∈ RLΣ+ and an asset price
q ∈ RJ , we introduce the budget set of an agent i ∈ I by:
Bi(p, q, t) :=
{
(xi, θi) ∈ Xi ×Θi : p (xi − ei + g˜i) + r˜ ◦ [(p (xi − ei)−] 6 V˜ θi + wi + ξit˜
}
A consumption plan xi ∈ Xi and a composition of portfolio θi ∈ Θi are budget feasible for
agent i ∈ I if these actions belong to budget set Bi(p, q, t).
Given a commodity price vector p ∈ RLΣ+ , agent i’s behavior in this economy is summarized
by the demand correspondence di(p, q, t) defined by:
di(p, q, t) :=
{
(xi, θi) ∈ Bi(p, q, t), Bi(p, q, t) ∩ [P i(xi)×Θi] = ∅}
where P i(xi) := {y ∈ Xi : ui(y) > ui(xi)}.
Definition 2.1. A collection (x•, θ•, p, q, t) ∈ RLΣI+ × RJI × RLΣ+ × RJ+ × RΣ is a monetary
equilibrium of a monetary economy E = (Ec, Ef , Em) if
(i) For each agent i ∈ I, (xi, θi) ∈ di(p, q, t),
(ii) The public plan t satisfies the authority’s budget constraints:
t˜ = r˜ ◦ (p∑i∈I(xi − ei)−)+ p g˜ − V˜ θ − w.
(iii) Commodity and asset markets clear:
∑
i∈I x
i =
∑
i∈I e
i and
∑
i∈I θ
i = θ.
A monetary equilibrium is said to be with no-transfers if t˜ = 0.
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2.4. Assumptions. Before stating the assumptions, let us introduce the following notation: A
vector v = (v(σ), σ ∈ Σ)) in RΣ is said to be positive, denoted by v > 0, if ∀σ ∈ Σ, v(σ) >
0, v 6= 0, and it is said to be strictly positive, denoted by v À 0 if, ∀σ ∈ Σ, v(σ) > 0.
The commodity market Ec = (X•, u•, e•, g•, ξ•) is subject to the following assumptions: for
each agent i ∈ I,
C1 The consumption set Xi is a closed, convex subset of the positive orthant of RLΣ, and ei > 0.
C2 The utility function is continuous, strictly monotone and strictly quasi-concave.3
C3 There exists a consumption plan xi ∈ Xi such that xi − ei + gi ¿ 0.
This is a strong survival assumption in this extended model. After paying his taxes, agent i can
still consume.
The financial market Ef = (R,Θ•, θ) is subject to the following assumptions:
F1 For each agent i ∈ I, the portfolio set Θi is equal to RJ .
F2 The return matrix R has full rank. For convenience, we assume R > 04.
F3 The public portfolio is non-negative, i.e. θ > 0.
Non-risky asset
NRA The public portfolio is a non-risky portfolio:
Rθ À 0.
Assumptions (C1) to (F2) are the standard assumptions considering an incomplete market frame-
work. We provide hereafter specific assumptions due to the extension of the incomplete market
framework that we consider.
Transfers
T1 Transfers t are distributed among agents through given shares ξ•, i.e. each agent receives
the amount ξit.
Public Revenue
PR Aggregate taxes g =
∑
i∈I g
i are strictly positive.
Definition 2.2. A monetary economy E = (Ec, Ef , Em) is said to be standard if it satisfies the
above assumptions
Initial public debt
M1 The total amount of initial liabilities is positive: w(0) > 0.
Finally, we propose in the following two additional assumptions on the financial and money
market Ef = (R,Θ•, θ):
3The utility function ui is strictly quasi-concave if:
∀xi,∀ yi ∈ Xi, and ∀λ ∈ [0, 1], ui(xi) > ui(yi) implies ui(λxi + (1− λ)yi) > ui(yi)
4Assuming that the public portfolio is a non-risky portfolio (refer to Assumption (NRA) defined later), there
is no loss of generality in considering R > 0. One may refer to Lemma 4.3 for the proof of this result.
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Public Portfolio
PP The public portfolio consists only in safe bonds5, i.e. θ = I1J6.
Neither (PP) implies (NRA), nor is the converse true. Assumption (PP) is a restrictive
assumption, but allows us to precise properties on first period price levels that is lost when one
considers only (NRA) (refer to Theorem 2.2, or Theorem 2.3). The results to be proved are the
following:
Theorem 2.1. Let E be a standard monetary economy. Under assumptions (M1), for every
path of rate of interest r > 0 fixed by the authority, there exists a monetary equilibrium with no
transfers (x•, θ•, p, q) of E.
Remark 2.1. In the previous theorem, we may consider a weaker version of Assumption (PR),
namely, requiring g(σ) > 0 in all states σ ∈ Σ.
Before stating the existence of a monetary equilibrium with transfers, let us introduce the
following notations: We endow the dimensional space Rn with norm 1: for any vector h ∈ Rn,
‖h‖ =
n∑
d=1
|hd|. And we denote by B(n, k) the closed ball on Rn of radius k > 0, with center 0.
Let d ∈ RΣ++. We call d(σ) the overall price level at date-event σ ∈ Σ when d is defined by:
d(0) = ‖p(0)‖+ ‖q˜‖ and d(s) = ‖p(s)‖ , s ∈ S.
Theorem 2.2. Let E be a standard monetary economy. Under assumption (PP), for every
path of rate of interest r > 0 fixed by the authority, there is d? ∈ RΣ+, such that, for every
d > d?, d À 0, there exists a monetary equilibrium with transfers (x•, θ•, p, q, t) of E with
‖p(0)‖+ ‖q˜‖ = d(0) and ‖p(s)‖ = d(s) for every date-event s ∈ S of the second period.
We also prove that by choosing a higher price level (c? > d?), we show that, at equilibrium,
transfers are positive.
Theorem 2.3. Let E be a standard monetary economy. Under assumption (PP), for every
path of rate of interest r > 0 fixed by the authority, there is c? ∈ RΣ, c? À 0 such that, for
every c > c? there exists a monetary equilibrium with positive transfers (x•, θ•, p, q, t) of E with
‖p(0)‖+ ‖q˜‖ = c(0) and ‖p(s)‖ = c(s) for every date-event s ∈ S of the second period.
If we drop assumption (PP), we get the following corollaries of Theorem 2.2 and Theorem
2.3:
Corollary 2.1. Let E be a standard monetary economy. For every path of rate of interest r > 0
fixed by the authority, there is e? ∈ RS , e? À 0 such that, for every e > e? there exists a
monetary equilibrium with transfers (x•, θ•, p, q, t) of E with ‖p(s)‖ = e(s) for every date-event
s ∈ S of the second period.
Corollary 2.2. Let E be a standard monetary economy. For every path of rate of interest r > 0
fixed by the authority, there is e? ∈ RS , e? À 0 such that, for every e > e? there exists a
monetary equilibrium with positive transfers (x•, θ•, p, q, t) of E with ‖p(s)‖ = e(s) for every
date-event s ∈ S of the second period.
5Given a dimensional space Rn, we denote I1n the vector in Rn with all components equal to one.
6Notice that it is equivalent to consider any public portfolio θ À 0 in assumption (PP), given an adequate
corresponding choice of the return matrix R.
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It is important to notice here that Corollary 2.1 is a consequence of Theorem 2.2, while
Corollary 2.2 is a consequence of Theorem 2.3. A more reasonable assumption on the public
portfolio (in particular (NRA)) prevents us to get precise information on first period price levels.
The next section is devoted for the proof of the case of no transfers. Section 4 will study the
case of transfers.
3. Existence of Monetary Equilibrium with No Transfers
The proof follows the usual scheme considering an incomplete market setting, The general
method of proof is the usual incomplete market arguments as in Duffie [7], Florenzano [8],
Werner [16], among others.
We begin by identifying compact, convex sets for consumption sets and portfolio sets. Adapt-
ing the work of Bloize–Dre`ze–Polemarchakis [1] in an incomplete market framework, we modify
budget sets by introducing an index µ ∈ RΣ+ of the reciprocal of the overall price level leading
to well-behaved correspondences. Applying Kakutani’s fixed point theorem in (p, q, x•, θ•, µ)
leads to the existence of an abstract equilibrium, an equilibrium concept which is defined below
(Definition 3.2). The last step of the proof consists in showing that under (PR)–(NRA)–(M1),
the introduced index is strictly positive, and the abstract equilibrium is achieved as an monetary
equilibrium with no transfers.
3.1. Truncating the economy. Given assumptions (C2) and (F2), we may restrict ourselves
to positive commodity and asset prices. We consider the following compact, convex set for
commodity and asset price vectors:
Π =
{
(p, q) ∈ RLΣ+ × RJ+ : ‖p(0)‖+ ‖q˜‖ = 1 and ‖p(s)‖ = 1, ∀s ∈ S
}
We provide hereafter the definition of a truncated monetary economy. The following lemma
establishes that in order to prove Theorem 2.1, we can suppose without any loss of generality
that commodity and financial sets are compact.
Definition 3.1. If Ec = (X•, u•, e•, g•, ξ•) is a commodity market, and Ef = (R,Θ•, θ) is a
financial market, then for any k > 0, we let Eck and Efk defined by
Eck = (X•k , u•k, e•, g•, ξ•) Efk = (R,Θ•k, θ)
where, for each i ∈ I, Xik = Xi ∩ B(Σ × L, k). We set uik as the restriction of ui to Xik,
Θik = Θ
i ∩B(J, k).
Let X̂ the set of attainable commodity allocations, i.e.
X̂ :=
{
x ∈
∏
i∈I
Xi :
∑
i∈I
(xi − ei) = 0
}
(3.1)
For every i ∈ I, X̂i is the projection of X̂ on Xi.
The sets (Θ̂i, i ∈ I) of attainable portfolios are defined as follows:
Θ̂i := {θi ∈ Θi : ∃(p, q) ∈ Π, ∃xi ∈ X̂i, p (xi − ei + g˜i) + r˜ ◦ (p (xi − ei)−) = V˜ θi + wi}.
We set Θ̂ =
∏
i∈I
Θ̂i.
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Lemma 3.1. Let Ec commodity market and Ef a financial market. Then
(a) There exists k > 0 such that
∀i ∈ I, X̂i ⊂ intB(Σ× L, k), Θ̂i ⊂ intB(J, k)(3.2)
(b) If k > 0 is sufficiently large such that 3.2 is satisfied, then for each money market Em, any
monetary equilibrium of the truncated economy (Eck, Efk , Em) is a monetary equilibrium
of the initial economy (Ec, Ef , Em).
The proof of Lemma 3.1 is referred to the appendix (A1). We can now fix k > 0. Following
Lemma 3.1, we can suppose without any loss of generality that for each i ∈ I, the sets Xi and
Θi are compact. Let us introduce the following notation: Consider a set V ⊂ Rn. We recall
that the convex hull of V, denoted by co (V ) ⊂ Rn is the smallest convex set containing V .
For convenience of notation, we set v(x) ∈ RΣ+ such that:
v(x, σ) =
∑
i∈I
(
xi(σ)− ei(σ))− , ∀σ ∈ Σ.
Since µ ∈ RΣ is also a variable involved in our fixed-point argument, we propose the following
convex set:
M := co
 µ ∈ RΣ+
∃x ∈ ∏
i∈I
Xi, ∃(p, q) ∈ Π,
µ(0)w(0) = r˜(0)p(0) · v(x, 0) + p(0) · g˜(0) + q˜θ
µ(s)(R˜(s)θ) = r˜(s)p(s) · v(x, s) + p(s) · g˜(s)

Claim 3.1. The set M ⊂ RΣ is compact.
Proof. The compactness of M follows from assumptions (M1)–(F2)–(NRA) and from the com-
pactness of X and Π. Let (xiν , pν , qν) be a sequence in X
i×Π and (µν) a sequence in M . Then,
for each ν ∈ N, we have
µν(0)w(0) = r˜(0)
(
p(0) ·
∑
i∈I
(
xiν(0)− ei(0)
)−)+ pν(0) · g˜(0) + qνθi
µν(s)(R˜(s)θ) = r˜(s)
(
pν(s) ·
∑
i∈I
(
xiν(s)− ei(s)
)−)+ pν(s) · g˜(s)
According to assumption (M1), w(0) > 0, and according to (NRA), (R(s)θ) > 0, ∀s ∈ S, thus
we can suppose that µν converges µ. Note that µ ∈M . 
3.2. Modifying budget sets. For each (p, q, µ) ∈ Π ×M , we define βi(p, q, µ) the following
modified budget set of agent i ∈ I defined by the set of actions (xi, θi) ∈ Xi ×Θi such that:
p(0) · (xi(0)− ei(0) + g˜i(0)) + r˜(0) (p(0) · (xi(0)− ei(0))−) 6 −q˜θi + µ(0)wi(0)
p(s) · (xi(s)− ei(s) + g˜i(s)) + r˜(s) (p(s) · (xi(s)− ei(s))−) 6 µ(s)(R˜θi)(s), ∀s ∈ S
The associated demand correspondence is defined by:
δi(p, q, µ) :=
{
(xi, θi) ∈ βi(p, q, µ), βi(p, q, µ) ∩ [P i(xi)×Θi] = ∅}
Let us begin by introducing the notion of abstract equilibrium
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Definition 3.2. An abstract equilibrium consists in a collection (p, q, x•, θ•) and an index of
the reciprocal overall price levels µ ∈ RΣ+, such that:
(i) For every agent i ∈ I, (xi, θi) ∈ δi(p, q, µ)
(ii) The authority’s constraints are satisfied
r˜(0)p(0) ·
∑
i∈I
(xi(0)− ei(0))− + p(0) · g˜(0) = µ(0)w(0)− q˜ · θ
r˜(s)p(s) ·
∑
i∈I
(xi(s)− ei(s))− + p(s) · g˜(s) = µ(s)(R˜θ)(s), ∀s ∈ S
(iii) Markets clear:
∑
i∈I x
i =
∑
i∈I e
i and
∑
i∈I θ
i = θ,
Remark 3.1. If µÀ 0 , and (p, q, x•, θ•, µ) is an abstract equilibrium of E , then (p′, q′, x•, θ•) is
a monetary equilibrium given that
p′(σ) =
p(σ)
µ(σ)
,∀σ ∈ Σ and q′ = q
µ(0)
.
For each i ∈ I, for each (p, q, µ) ∈ Π×M , we denote by β′i the interior of the set βi on Π×M .
Lemma 3.2. For every agent i ∈ I, the correspondence β′i has non-empty values on Π×M .
The proof of this lemma is referred in appendix (A2). We have the following properties for
the modified correspondences:
Claim 3.2. For each agent i ∈ I,
(i) the correspondence βi is u.s.c. on Π×M with compact convex values.
(ii) the correspondence βi is l.s.c. on Π×M .
(iii) the demand correspondence δi is u.s.c. on Π×M with non-empty compact, convex values.
The proof of this claim is given in appendix (A3).
3.3. Applying Kakutani’s fixed point theorem. Let us define the correspondence
F : Π×
∏
i∈I
Xi ×
∏
i∈I
Θi ×M −→ Π×
∏
i∈I
Xi ×
∏
i∈I
Θi ×M
such that:
F (p, q, x•, θ•, µ) = Φ(x•, θ•)×
∏
i∈I
δi(p, q, µ)× Γ(x•, p, q)
where
Φ(x•, θ•) =
{
(p, q) ∈ Π: ∀(p′, q˜′) ∈ Π, (p− p′) ·
∑
i∈I
(
xi − ei)+ (q˜ − q˜′) ·(∑
i∈I
θi − θ
)
> 0)
}
and
Γ(x•, p, q) =
{
µ ∈M : µ(0)w(0) = r˜(0)p(0) ·
∑
i∈I
(
xi(0)− ei(0))− + p(0) · g˜(0) + q˜θ
µ(s)(R˜θ)(s) = r˜(s)p(s) ·∑i∈I (xi(s)− ei(s))− + p(s) · g˜(s)
}
INCOMPLETE MARKETS AND MONETARY POLICY 11
Correspondence F is u.s.c. with non-empty convex compact values. Applying Kakutani’s
fixed point theorem, there exists (p, q, x•, θ•, µ) ∈ Π×∏i∈I Xi ×∏i∈I Θi ×M such that:
∀i ∈ I, (xi, θi) ∈ δi(p, q, µ),(3.3)
∀(p, q) ∈ Π, (p− p) ·
∑
i∈I
(xi − ei) + (q˜ − q˜) · (
∑
i∈I
θ
i − θ) 6 0,(3.4)
µ(0)w(0) = r˜(0)
(
p(0) ·
∑
i∈I
(
xi(0)− ei(0))−)+ p(0) · g˜(0) + q˜θ(3.5)
µ(s)(R˜θ)(s) = r˜(s)
(
p(s) ·
∑
i∈I
(
xi(s)− ei(s))−)+ p(s) · g˜(s)(3.6)
We will now show that the obtained fixed point is an abstract equilibrium. In order to do
this, we need only to prove that commodity and asset markets clear. This follows from Claims
3.3 to 3.8.
For convenience, we introduce the following sets ∆(σ), ∀σ ∈ Σ:
∆(0) := {(p(0), q) ∈ RL+×RJ+ : ‖p(0)‖+‖q‖ = 1} ∆(s) := {(p(s), s ∈ S) ∈ RSL+ : ‖p(s)‖ = 1}
Note that ∆(σ) for all date-event σ ∈ Σ are simply projections of Π. For a given set U ∈ Rn, we
denote by U◦ the negative polar cone of U , i.e. the cone of vectors η ∈ Rn such that η · u 6 0,
for every u ∈ U .
Claim 3.3. At the first period, we have the following property:∑
i∈I
xi(0) 6
∑
i∈I
ei(0), and
∑
i∈I
θ¯i 6 θ
Proof. Taking p(s) = p(s) for every date-event s ∈ S in fixed point property (3.4), one has, for
all prices (p(0), q) ∈ ∆(0):
p(0) ·
∑
i∈I
(xi(0)− ei(0)) + q · (
∑
i∈I
θ¯i − θ) 6 p(0) ·
∑
i∈I
(xi(0)− ei(0)) + q˜ · (
∑
i∈I
θ¯i − θ)(3.7)
Moreover, fixed point property (3.3) states that (xi, θi) ∈ βi(p, q, µ). Summing first period
constraints among all agents and recalling fixed point property (3.5), we get:
p(0) ·
∑
i∈I
(
xi(0)− ei(0))+ q˜ · (∑
i∈I
θ¯i − θ) 6 0(3.8)
According to inequalities (3.7) and (3.8), one has:
p(0) ·
∑
i∈I
(
xi(0)− ei(0))+ q · (∑
i∈I
θ¯i − θ) 6 0, ∀(p(0), q) ∈ ∆(0).
Thus
[∑
i∈I
(
xi(0)− ei(0)) ; (∑i∈I θ¯i − θ)] ∈ [∆(0)]◦ = RLJ− , i.e.∑
i∈I
xi(0) 6
∑
i∈I
ei(0) and
∑
i∈I
θ¯i 6 θ.

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Claim 3.4. At the second period, commodity markets satisfy:∑
i∈I
xi(s) 6
∑
i∈I
ei(s), ∀s ∈ S
Proof. Consider a date-event s ∈ S. According to fixed point property (3.4), by choosing
p(σ) = p(σ) for all date-event σ ∈ Σ \ {s} and q = q, one has:
p(s) ·
∑
i∈I
(
xi(s)− ei(s)) 6 p(s) ·∑
i∈I
(
xi(s)− ei(s)) , ∀ p(s) ∈ ∆(s).
Moreover, fixed point property (3.3) states that (xi, θi) ∈ βi(p, q, µ). Summing second period
constraints among all agents and recalling fixed point property (3.6), we get:
p(s) ·
∑
i∈I
(
xi(s)− ei(s)) 6 µ(s)R(s)(∑
i∈I
θ¯i − θ)(3.9)
Since µ > 0, R > 0 (assumption (F2)), and (
∑
i∈I θ¯
i−θ) 6 0 (Claim 3.3), focusing on date-event
s, one has:
p(s) ·
∑
i∈I
(
xi(s)− ei(s)) 6 0, ∀p(s) ∈ ∆(s)(3.10)
This means that
(
xi(s)− ei(s)) ∈ [∆(s)]◦ = RL−, i.e. ∑i∈I xi(s) 6∑i∈I ei(s). 
Claim 3.5. Budget constraints of all agents i ∈ I are saturated:
p(0) · (xi(0)− ei(0) + g˜i(0)) + r˜(0) (p(0) · (xi(0)− ei(0))−)+ q˜θi = µ(0)wi(0)(3.11)
p(s) · (xi(s)− ei(s) + g˜i(s)) + r˜(s) (p(s) · (xi(s)− ei(s))−) = µ(s)(R˜θi)(s)(3.12)
Proof. We will only consider the case where s ∈ S (for s = 0, the proof is similar). Assume on
the contrary that (3.12) does not hold, i.e. there exists i ∈ I, and a date-event s ∈ S where the
equality is not true, i.e.
p(s) · (xi(s)− ei(s) + g˜i(s)) + r˜(s) (p(s) · (xi(s)− ei(s))−) < µ(s)(R˜θi)(s).
In view of Claims (3.3)–(3.4) and of our choice of k, there exists some consumption plan xi ∈
B(ΣL, k) satisfying xi > xi and
p(s) · (xi(s)− ei(s) + g˜i(s)) + r˜(s)(p(s) · (xi(s)− ei(s))−) 6 (V˜ θi)(s) + wi(s).
Thus, (xi, θi) ∈ βi(p, q, µ). Following assumption (C1), ui(xi) > ui(xi), which yields a contra-
diction to the fixed point property 3.3. 
Claim 3.6. Commodity prices are strictly positive, i.e. pÀ 0.
Proof. Indeed, if not, there exists a date-event σ ∈ Σ and a good ` ∈ L such that p(σ, `) = 0.
Let us consider an agent i ∈ I. In view of our choice of k and Claims (3.3)–(3.4), we can
find some consumption plan xi ∈ B(ΣL, k) such that xi(σ) > xi(σ) and (xi, θi) ∈ βi(p, q, µ).
Following assumption (C1), ui(xi) > ui(xi), which yields a contradiction to the fixed point
property (3.3). 
Claim 3.7. At first period, we have the following property:∑
i∈I
xi(0) =
∑
i∈I
ei(0) and q˜ ·
(∑
i∈I
θ
i − θ
)
= 0
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Proof. Indeed, according to Claim (3.5), summing among all agents equalities (3.11), one has
p(0) ·
∑
i∈I
(
xi(0)− ei(0))+ q˜ ·(∑
i∈I
θi − θ
)
= 0
Since (p(0), q˜) ∈ RLJ+ ,
(
xi(0)− ei(0)) 6 0, and (∑i∈I θi − θ) 6 0, one has:
p(0) ·
∑
i∈I
(
xi(0)− ei(0)) = 0 and q˜ ·(∑
i∈I
θi − θ
)
= 0(3.13)
Since p(0)À 0, we get ∑i∈I xi(0) =∑i∈I ei(0).

Claim 3.8. Asset markets clear and second period commodity markets clear:∑
i∈I
θ
i = θ and
∑
i∈I
xi(s) =
∑
i∈I
ei(s)
Proof. Indeed, according to the previous claim, one has q˜ ·(∑i∈I θi − θ) = 0. Moreover, referring
to claim (3.4), inequality (3.8) tells us that R(s)
(∑
i∈I θ
i − θ
)
6 0. Thus, by setting θ =
−
(∑
i∈I θ
i − θ
)
one has V˜ θ > 0. Assume that there exists a date-event σ ∈ Σ such that
V˜ (σ)θ > 0.(3.14)
Let an agent i ∈ I. According to Claim 3.5, budget constraints of agents are saturated at fixed
point. Consider an agent i ∈ I, One has,
p (xi − ei + g˜i) + r˜ ◦ (p (xi − ei)−) = V˜ θi
Hence, for λ > 0, one has (xi, θi + λθ) ∈ βi(p, q˜, µ). Moreover, recalling inequality (3.14), one
has at date-event σ ∈ Σ,
p(σ) · (xi(σ)− ei(σ) + g˜i(σ)) + r˜(σ)(p(σ) · (xi(σ)− ei(σ))−) < V˜ (σ)(θi + λθ)
One can find an allocation xi ∈ B(ΣL, k) such that (xi, (θi+λθ)) ∈ δi(p, q˜, µ) which contradicts
fixed point property (3.3). As for the clearance of second period commodity markets, it is
straightforward by summing among all agents second period’s saturated budget constraints
(3.12) and the fact that p(s)À 0 for all date-event s ∈ S (Claim 3.6). 
We have proved that there exists an abstract equilibrium. In order for the abstract equilibrium
to be achieved as an equilibrium, we need to show that at every abstract equilibrium, µ À 0.
The following lemma shows under what condition this is satisfied.
Lemma 3.3. Under (M1)–(NRA)–(PR), at every abstract equilibrium µÀ 0, and the abstract
equilibrium is achieved as an equilibrium.
Proof. Assume that (PR) is satisfied. Referring to 3.5, one has:
µ(0)w(0) > p(0)g˜(0) + q˜ · θ.
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Since p(0) À 0, the fact that g˜(0) À 0 and recalling assumption (M1), w(0) > 0, one has
µ(0) > 0.
Moreover, referring to 3.6, one has at a state s ∈ S of the second period:
µ(s)(Rθ)(s) > p(s)g˜(s) > 0.
Since θ is a non-risky portfolio, one has µ(s) > 0, ∀s ∈ S.

Hence, we have proved the existence of an abstract equilibrium with strictly positive index
of the reciprocal of the overall price level. Following remark 3.1, we get that there exists a
monetary equilibrium (p′, q′, x•, θ•) with no transfers, where
p′(σ) =
p(σ)
µ(σ)
, ∀σ ∈ Σ and q′ = q
µ(0)
.
4. Existence of Monetary Equilibrium with Transfers
Let E be a standard economy satisfying assumption (PP) and (NRA). Let d ∈ RΣ++. Given
assumptions (C1) and (F2), we may restrict ourselves to positive commodity and asset prices.
We consider the following convex, compact set for commodity and asset price vectors:
Πd =
{
(p, q) ∈ RLΣ+ × RJ+ : ‖p(0)‖+ ‖q˜‖ = d(0) and ‖p(s)‖ = d(s), ∀s ∈ S
}
4.1. Truncating the economy. We provide hereafter the definition of a truncated monetary
economy. The following lemma establishes that in order to prove Theorem 2.2 and Theorem 2.3,
we can suppose without any loss of generality that commodity and financial sets are compact.
Transfers are also considered to belong to an adequate compact, convex set.
Definition 4.1. If Ec = (X•, u•, e•, g•, ξ•) is a commodity market, and Ef = (R,Θ•, θ) is a
financial market, then for any h > 0, we let Ech and Efh defined by
Ech = (X•h, u•h, e•, g•, ξ•) Efh = (R,Θ•h, θ)
where, for each i ∈ I, Xih = Xi ∩ B(Σ × L, h). We set uih as the restriction of ui to Xik,
Θih = Θ
i ∩B(J, h), and Th = B(Σ, h).
Let X̂ is the set of attainable commodity allocations defined in (3.1). We set T̂ the set of
attainable transfers, i.e.
T̂ =
{
t ∈ RΣ : ∃x• ∈ X̂, ∃(p, q˜) ∈ Πd, t˜ = r˜ ◦
(
p
∑
i∈I
(
xi − ei)−)+ p g˜ − V˜ θ − w}
Let the set of attainable portfolios be defined by:
Θ̂i = {θi ∈ Θi : ∃(p, q˜) ∈ Πd, ∃xi ∈ X̂i, ∃t ∈ T̂ , p (xi−ei+g˜i)+r˜ ◦ (p (xi−ei)−) = V˜ θi+wi+ξit˜}
We set Θ̂ =
∏
i∈I
Θ̂i.
Notice here that the attainable portfolio sets depend now on transfers t ∈ T̂ , thus compactness
of Θ̂ will crucially depend on the compactness of T̂ .
Lemma 4.1. Let Ec commodity market and Ef a financial market. Then
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(a) There exists h > 0 such that
∀i ∈ I, X̂i ⊂ intB(Σ× L, h), Θ̂i ⊂ intB(J, h) and T̂ ⊂ B(Σ, h)(4.1)
(b) If h > 0 is sufficiently large such that 4.1 is satisfied, then for each money market Em, any
monetary equilibrium of the truncated economy (Ech, Efh , Em) is a monetary equilibrium
of the initial economy (Ec, Ef , Em).
The proof of this lemma is referred in appendix (A4). We can now fix h > 0. Following
Lemma 4.1, we can suppose without any loss of generality that for each i ∈ I, the sets Xi and
Θi are compact. For convenience, we set T = Th.
4.2. Modifying budget sets. We will begin by defining the adequate price level that one
should consider. Let an agent i ∈ I. According to assumption (C3), for every agent i ∈ I, there
exists a consumption plan xi ∈ Xi such that xi− ei+ gi ¿ 0. Thus, for every date-event σ ∈ Σ,
there exists χi(σ) > 0 such that xi − ei + gi ¿ −χiI1Σ.
We will need the following notation: g(σ) = Inf {g(σ, l), l ∈ L}. Let
d?(0) := Max
0 :
(
w(0)−min
i∈I
{wi(0)
ξi
}
)
min{1, g(0)} (1 + r(0))
(4.2)
d?(s) :=
R(s)θ
g(s) + min
i∈I
{χi(s)
ξi
}
, ∀s ∈ S(4.3)
Consider price levels dÀ 0, d > d?, and let the mapping γ, from T into T ,7 be defined by:
γ(t) := γ((t, σ), σ ∈ Σ) where γ(t, σ) = max{t˜(σ), K˜(σ)},(4.4)
given that
K(0) := d(0)Min {1, g(0)} − w(0)(1 + r(0)), K(s) := d(s)g(s)−R(s)θ, ∀s ∈ S.(4.5)
For each i ∈ I, for each (p, q, t) ∈ Πd × T , we define the following correspondances:
Bid(p, q, γ(t)) := {(xi, θi) ∈ Xi×Θi : p (xi−ei+ g˜i)+ r˜ ◦
(
p (xi − ei)−) 6 V˜ θi+wi+ξiγ(t)}.
βid(p, q, γ(t)) := {(xi, θi) ∈ Xi×Θi : p (xi−ei+ g˜i)+ r˜ ◦
(
p (xi − ei)−)¿ V˜ θi+wi+ξiγ(t)}.
did(p, q, γ(t)) := {(xi, θi) ∈ Xi×Θi : (xi, θi) ∈ Bid(p, q, γ(t)) and [P i(xi)×Θi]∩Bid(p, q, γ(t)) := ∅}
As we shall see in the following lemma, the constructed price level d? ∈ RΣ+ leads to the
non-emptyness of βid on Πd × T .
Lemma 4.2. For every agent i ∈ I, the correspondence βid has non-empty values on Πd × T .
For the proof of Lemma 4.2, refer to appendix (A5). We have the following properties for the
modified correspondences:
Claim 4.1. For each agent i ∈ I,
(i) the correspondence Bid is u.s.c. on Πd × T with compact convex values.
7Recall that T = Th, and given the definition of K, one can always choose h > 0 big enough in order for γ to
be defined from T into T .
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(ii) the correspondence Bid is l.s.c. on Πd × T .
(iii) the demand correspondence is u.s.c. on Πd× T with non-empty compact, convex values.
The constructed correspondences are well behaved. We may now apply a fixed point theorem
that will lead us to the existence of a monetary equilibrium.
4.3. Applying Kakutani’s fixed point theorem. Let us define the correspondence
Fd : Πd ×
∏
i∈I
Xi ×
∏
i∈I
Θi × T −→ Πd ×
∏
i∈I
Xi ×
∏
i∈I
Θi × T
such that:
Fd(p, q, x•, θ•, t) = Φd(x•, θ•)×
∏
i∈I
did(p, q, γ(t))× Γd(p, q, x•, θ•)
where
Φd(x•, θ•) =
{
(p, q) ∈ Πd : ∀(p′, q′) ∈ Πd, (p− p′) ·
∑
i∈I
(xi − ei) + (q˜ − q˜′) · (
∑
i∈I
θi − θ) > 0)
}
and
Γd(p, q, x•) =
{
t ∈ T : t˜ = r˜ ◦
(
p
∑
i∈I
(
xi − ei)−)+ p g˜ − V˜ θ − w}
The correspondence Fd is u.s.c. with non-empty convex compact values. Applying Kakutani’s
fixed point theorem, there exists (p, q, x•, θ•, t ) ∈ Πd ×
∏
i∈I X
i ×∏i∈I Θi × T such that:
∀i ∈ I, (xi, θi) ∈ did(p, q, γ(t)),(4.6)
∀(p, q) ∈ Πd, (p− p) ·
∑
i∈I
(xi − ei) + (q˜ − q˜) · (
∑
i∈I
θ
i − θ) 6 0,(4.7)
t˜ = r˜ ◦
(
p
∑
i∈I
(
xi − ei)−)+ p g˜ − V˜ θ − w.(4.8)
Notice here that the fixed point obtained satisfies (xi, θi) ∈ di(p, q, γ(t)). According to the
authority’s constraints (4.8) and the definition of γ (refer to 4.4), one has γ(t) = t˜. Thus,
(xi, θi) ∈ did(p, q, t). Finally, in order to prove that the obtained fixed point is achieved as a
monetary equilibrium, we need only to show that commodity and asset markets clear. These
proofs are very similar to the case of no transfers, one needs only to replace conditions (3.5) and
(3.6) by the new authority’s constraint (4.8).
4.4. Application: The case of positive transfers. This section is devoted to the proof of
Theorem 2.3: In choosing a higher price level, we get to positive transfers.
Claim 4.2. Under assumptions (M1)–(PR) and (PP), there exists a price level c? ∈ RΣ+ above
which transfers are positive elements of RΣ, for any consumption allocation x• ∈ RΣLI .
Proof. Let c? ∈ RΣ++, c? = (c?(σ), σ ∈ Σ). Consider a state s ∈ S and let
c?(0) > w(0)
Min
{
1, g(0)
}(1 + r(0)) and c?(s) > R(s)θ
g(s)
,∀s ∈ S(4.9)
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Following (PR), c?(σ) is well-defined. Note that constant K defined in the previous section
(4.5) is nul, for all price level c?. Applying the results of sections 4.2 to 4.3 we obtain γ(t) =
Max {K˜, t˜}, i.e. t˜ > 0. 
Appendix
A1. Proof of Lemma 3.1:
Proof of Part (a) :
This part follows from the compactness of the sets X̂, and Θ̂. Indeed, the compactness of X̂
follows from Assumptions (C1). Following Assumptions (F1) and (F2), for each i ∈ I, the set
Θ̂i is closed and bounded: Indeed, let us consider (xiν , pν , qν) be a sequence in X̂
i ×Π and (θiν)
a sequence in Θ̂i. Then, for each ν ∈ N, we have
pν (xiν − ei + g˜i) + r˜ ◦ (pν (xiν − ei)−) = V˜ θiν + wi(4.10)
By a classical compactness argument, we may suppose that the sequence (xiν , pν , qν) converges
to (xi, p, q). If the sequence (θiν) is not bounded, then, passing to a subsequence if necessary, we
can suppose that limn
∥∥θiν∥∥ = +∞. Multiplying (4.12) by 1/∥∥θiν∥∥ and passing to the limit, there
exists κ ∈ RJ with V˜ κ = 0 where ‖κ‖ = 1. Assumption (F2) implies that if V˜ κ = 0 then κ = 0:
a contradiction. It follows that the sequence (θiν) is bounded, and passing to a subsequence if
necessary, we can suppose that there exists θi ∈ RJ such that (θiν) converges to θi and θi ∈ Θ̂i.
Proof of Part (b) :
Let (x•, θ•, p, q) be a monetary equilibrium with no-transfers of E = (Eck, Efk , Em). Suppose that
it is not a monetary equilibrium of E . Then for some i, there exists (xi, θi) ∈ Xi ×Θi such that
ui(xi) > ui(xi) and (xi, θi) is budget feasible. Since (xi, θi) belongs to intB(Σ× L, k) then, it
is easy to find 0 < λ 6 1 such that
(xi + λ(xi − xi)) ∈ Xik, and (θi + λ(θi − θi)) ∈ Θik
Moreover, (xi + λ(xi − xi), θi + λ(θi − θi)) is budget feasible. Indeed, we see in the following
that budget sets are convex: for this, we need only to recall that,
∀a, a ∈ RΣL, ∀λ ∈ [0, 1], (µa+ (1− λ)a)− 6 λa− + (1− λ)a−
Finally, from Assumption C.2, we also have
ui(xi + λ(xi − xi)) > ui(xi),
which yields a contradiction. 
A2. Proof of Lemma 3.2:
Proof. Let (p, q, µ) ∈ Π×M . Let an agent i ∈ I. According to (C3), we can choose a consumption
plan xi ∈ Xi such that xi−ei+gi ¿ 0. Since gi > 0 and xi−ei ¿ −gi 6 0, we get (xi−ei)+ = 0
and (xi − ei)− = −(xi − ei)À 0. Thus, for every state s ∈ S, one has:
p(s) · (xi(s)− ei(s) + g˜i(s)) + r˜(s)p(s) · (xi(s)− ei(s))− = (1− r˜(s))p(s) · (xi(s)− ei(s)) + p(s) · g˜i(s)
=
p(s)
1 + r(s)
· (xi(s)− ei(s) + gi(s)) < 0.
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If p(0) 6= 0, similarly, one has:
p(0) · (xi(0)− ei(0) + g˜i(0)) + r˜(0)p(0) · (xi(0)− ei(0))− = (1− r˜(0))p(0) · (xi(0)− ei(0)) + p(0) · g˜i(0)
=
p(0)
1 + r(0)
· (xi(0)− ei(0) + gi(0)) < 0.
and (xi, 0) belongs to β′i(p, q, µ).
If p(0) = 0, one has q 6= 0. Since 0 ∈ intΘi and for all σ ∈ S,
p(σ) · (xi(σ)− ei(σ) + g˜i(σ)) + r˜(σ) (p(σ) · (xi(σ)− ei(σ))−) < 0.
By a continuity argument, one can choose a portfolio θi ∈ Θi such that{
q˜ · θi < 0
p(s) · (xi(s)− ei(s) + g˜i(s)) + r˜(s) (p(s) · (xi(s)− ei(s))−) < µ(s)R(s)θi, ∀s ∈ S
which means that (xi, θi) ∈ βi(p, q˜, µ). 
A3. Proof of Claim 3.2:
Proof. : Let us begin by showing property (i): Let i ∈ I and (xn, θn, pn, qn, µn) be a sequence in
Xi×Θi×Π×M . Following standard compactness argument, one can assume that the sequence
(xn, θn, pn, qn, µn) converges to (x, θ, p, q, µ) and such that (xn, θn) ∈ βi(pn, qn, µn). For each
n ∈ N,
pn(0) · (xn(0)− ei(0) + g˜i(0)) + r˜(0)
(
pn(0) · (xn(0)− ei(0))−
)
6 −q˜ · θn + µn(0)wi(0)
pn(s) · (xn(s)− ei(s) + g˜i(s)) + r˜(s)
(
pn(s) · (xn(s)− ei(s))−
)
6 µn(s)(R˜θn)(s), ∀s ∈ S
Passing to the limit, we get (x, θ) belongs to βi(p, q, µ).
Let us now show that βi is l.s.c. on Π ×M : Let (p, q, µ) ∈ Π ×M . Since β′i(p, q, µ) has
non-empty, convex values (refer to lemma 3.1), we have βi(p, q, µ) = clβ′i(p, q, µ). Finally, the
claim follows from the fact that β′i(p, q, µ) has an open graph.
Finally, the u.s.c. follows from the continuity of the utility functions. Indeed, δi(p, q, µ) is the
argmax of ui on βi(p, q, µ). Since ui is continuous and βi is continuous on Π×M , it follows from
Berge’s Maximum theorem that δi is u.s.c. on Π×M with non-empty values. The convexity of
δi(p, q, µ) follows from the quasi-concavity of ui. 
A4. Proof of Lemma 4.1:
Proof of Part (a) :
This part follows from the compactness of the sets X̂, T̂ and Θ̂. Indeed, the compactness of X̂
follows from Assumptions (C1). Following Assumptions (F1) and (F2), for each i ∈ I, the set Θ̂i
is bounded. Indeed, for this end, let us begin by showing that T̂ is a closed and bounded subset
of RΣ. Let (x•ν , pν , qν) be a sequence in T̂ × X̂×Πd. Following standard compactness argument,
we may assume that the sequence (x•ν , pν , qν) converges to (x•, p, q). Let (tν) a sequence in T̂ .
For each ν ∈ N, we thus have
tν = r˜ ◦
(
pν
∑
i∈I
(
xi − ei)−)+ pν g˜ − V˜ θ − w(4.11)
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Passing to a subsequence if necessary, we can suppose that there exists t ∈ RΣ such that (tν)
converges to t and t ∈ T̂ . Let us consider an agent i ∈ I. We now show that Θ̂i is a closed
and bounded subset of RJ . Let us consider (xiν , pν , qν , tν) be a sequence in X̂i × Πd × T̂ . By a
classical compactness argument, we may assume that the sequence (xiν , pν , qν , tν) converges to
(xi, p, q, t). Let (θiν) be a sequence in Θ̂
i. Then, for each ν ∈ N, we thus have
pν (xiν − ei + g˜i) + r˜ ◦ (pν (xiν − ei)−) = V˜ θiν + wi + ξit˜ν(4.12)
If the sequence (θiν) is not bounded, then, passing to a subsequence if necessary, we can suppose
that limn
∥∥θiν∥∥ = +∞. Multiplying (4.12) by 1/∥∥θiν∥∥ and passing to the limit, there exists
κ ∈ RJ with κ = 0 where ‖κ‖ = 1: a contradiction. It follows that the sequence (θiν) is bounded,
and passing to a subsequence if necessary, we can suppose that there exists θi ∈ RJ such that
(θiν) converges to θ
i and θi ∈ Θ̂i.
Proof of Part (b) :
Let (x•, θ•, p, q, t) be a monetary equilibrium of Eh = (Ech, Efh , Em). Suppose that it is not a
monetary equilibrium of E . Then for some i, there exists (xi, θi) ∈ Xi × Θi such that ui(xi) >
ui(xi) and (xi, θi) is budget feasible. Since (xi, θi) belongs to intB(Σ× L, h)× intB(J, h) then,
it is easy to find 0 < γ 6 1 such that
(xi + γ(xi − xi)) ∈ Xik, and (θi + γ(θi − θi)) ∈ Θik
Moreover, (xi + γ(xi − xi), θi + γ(θi − θi)) is budget feasible. Indeed, we see in the following
that budget sets are convex: for this, we need only to recall that,
∀a, a ∈ RΣL, ∀γ ∈ [0, 1], (γa+ (1− γ)a)− 6 γa− + (1− γ)a−
Finally, from Assumption C.2, we also have
ui(xi + γ(xi − xi)) > ui(xi),
which yields a contradiction. 
A.5 Proof of Lemma 4.2
Proof. Let an agent i ∈ I. According to (C3), we can choose a consumption plan xi ∈ Xi such
that xi − ei + gi ¿ −χiI1Σ. Since gi > 0 and xi − ei ¿ −gi 6 0, we get (xi − ei)+ = 0 and
(xi − ei)− = −(xi − ei)À 0. Thus, for every state s ∈ S, one has:
p(s) · (xi(s)− ei(s) + g˜i(s)) + r˜(s)p(s) · (xi(s)− ei(s))− = (1− r˜(s))p(s) · (xi(s)− ei(s)) + p(s) · g˜i(s)
=
p(s)
1 + r(s)
· (xi(s)− ei(s) + gi(s))
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Note that p(s) · (xi(s) − ei(s) + gi(s)) < −χi(s)d(s). But remark that by construction of d(s)
(refer to 4.3), one has −χi(s)d(s) 6 ξiK(s). Indeed,
d(s) > R(s)θ
g(s) + min
i∈I
{
χi(s)
ξi
}
d(s)g(s) + d(s)min
i∈I
{
χi(s)
ξi
}
> R(s)θ
d(s)g(s) + d(s)
χi(s)
ξi
> R(s)θ
−χ
i(s)
ξi
d(s) 6 d(s)g(s)−R(s)θ
−χi(s)d(s) 6 ξi (d(s)g(s)−R(s)θ)
Recalling the definition ofK(s), one has−χi(s)d(s) 6 ξiK(s), thus p(s)1+r(s) ·(xi(s)−ei(s)+gi(s)) <
ξiγ(t, s).
Moreover, if p(0) 6= 0, similarly to the case s ∈ S , one has:
p(0) · (xi(0)− ei(0) + g˜i(0)) + r˜(0)p(0) · (xi(0)− ei(0))− = p(0)
1 + r(0)
· (xi(0)− ei(0) + gi(0)) < 0
At date-event σ = 0, one has wi(0) + ξiγ(t, 0) > 0. Indeed, by construction (refer to 4.2), one
has
d(0) >
(
w(0)−min
i∈I
{wi(0)
ξi
}
)
(1 + r(0))
Min {1, g(0)}
d(0)Min {1, g(0)}+ (1 + r(0))min
i∈I
{
wi(0)
ξi
}
> (1 + r(0))w(0)
(1 + r(0))wi(0) + ξi
(
Min {1, g(0)}d(0)− (1 + r(0))w(0)) > 0
(1 + r(0))wi(0) + ξiK(0) > 0.
Since γ(t, 0) = Max {t˜(0), K˜(0)}, one has wi(0) + ξiγ(t, 0) > 0.
Hence, (xi, 0) belongs to βi(p, q˜, t).
If p(0) = 0, one has q 6= 0. Since 0 ∈ intΘi and for all s ∈ S,
p(s) · (xi(s)− ei(s) + g˜i(s)) + r˜(s) (p(s) · (xi(s)− ei(s))−) < ξiγ(t, s),
by a continuity argument, one can choose a portfolio θi ∈ Θi such that q˜·θi < 0 ≤ wi(0)+ξiγ(t, 0)
and
p(s) · (xi(s)− ei(s) + g˜i(s)) + r˜(s) (p(s) · (xi(s)− ei(s))−) < R˜(s)θi + ξiγ(t, s), ∀s ∈ S
and (xi, θi) belongs to βi(p, q, γ(t)). 
A6. Proof of Claim 4.1:
Proof. : Let us begin by showing property (i): Let i ∈ I and (xn, θn, pn, qn, γ(tn)) be a sequence
inXi×Θi×Πd×T . Following classical compactness argument, one can assume that the sequence
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(xn, θn, pn, qn, γ(tn)) converges to (x, θ, p, q, γ(t)) and such that (xn, θn) ∈ Bi(pn, qn, γ(tn)). For
each n ∈ N,
pn (xn − ei + g˜i) + r˜ ◦
(
pn (xn − ei)−
)
6 V˜ θn + wi + ξiγ(tn)(4.13)
Passing to the limit, we get (x, θ) belongs to Bid(p, q, γ(t)).
Let us now show that Bi is l.s.c. on Πd: Let (p, q) ∈ Πd. Since βid(p, q, γ(t)) has non-empty,
convex values (refer to lemma 4.1), we have Bid(p, q, γ(t)) = clβ
i
d(p, q, γ(t)). Finally, the claim
follows from the fact that βid(p, q, γ(t) has an open graph.
Finally, the u.s.c. follows from the continuity of the utility functions. Indeed, di(p, q, γ(t)) is
the argmax of ui on Bid(p, q, γ(t)). Since u
i is continuous and Bid is continuous on Πd, it follows
from Berge’s Maximum theorem that di is u.s.c. on Πd with non-empty values. The convexity
of di(p, q, γ(t)) follows from the quasi-concavity of ui. 
A.7. Proof of Corollary 2.1 and Corollary 2.1
Corollaries 2.1 and 2.2 follow from this result:
Lemma 4.3. There exists (R̂, θ̂) such that
R̂À 0, Span R̂ = SpanR, R̂θ̂ = Rθ and θ̂ = I1RJ .
Proof. The proof will be one in two steps. We begin by showing that there exists (R˜, θ˜) such
that
R˜θ˜ = Rθ, Span R˜ = SpanR and θ˜ = ek.8
Indeed, according to assumption (NRA), Rθ À 0. This implies that θ 6= 0, i.e. there exits an
asset k ∈ J such that θ(k) 6= 0. We posit
θ˜(k) = 1 and θ˜(j) = 0, ∀j 6= k
R˜(k) = Rθ and R˜(j) = R(j) ∀j 6= k.(4.14)
It is evident that R˜θ˜ = Rθ. We now show that Span R˜ = SpanR. By construction, Span R˜ ⊂
SpanR. Reciprocally, in order to show that SpanR ⊂ Span R˜, one only needs to show that
R(k) ⊂ Span R˜. This follows from the fact that
R(k) =
1
θ(k)
Rθ −∑
j 6=k
R(j)θ
 = 1
θ(k)
R˜(k)−∑
j 6=k
R˜(j)θ
 ⊂ Span R˜
We now show that there exists (R̂, θ̂) such that
R̂θ̂ = R˜θ˜, Span R̂ = Span R˜ and θ̂ = I1RJ
Let ² > 0 and define:
R̂(j) =
1
J
R˜(k) + ²R˜(j), ∀j 6= k
R̂(j) =
1
J
R˜(k)− ²
∑
j 6=k
R˜(j)
8The vector ek designates the vector in RJ with all its components equal to 0 except for the kth one.
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Notice that, for ² > 0 small enough, referring to (4.14), we have R˜(k) = Rθ À 0, one has R̂À 0.
Let us check that Span R̂ = Span R˜. By construction, Span R̂ ⊂ Span R˜. Reciprocally, since
J∑
j=1
R̂(j) = R˜(k), one has R˜(k) ⊂ Span R̂. Finally, for all j ∈ J, j 6= k, one has
R˜(j) =
1
²
(
R̂(j)− 1
J
R˜(k)
)
=
1
²
R̂(j)− 1
J
J∑
j=1
R̂(j)
 ⊂ Span R̂

The proof of Corollaries 2.1 and 2.2 follow:
Proof. Consider a standard economy E := (Ec, Ef , Em) satisfying assumption (NRA), i.e. Rθ À
0. According to Lemma 4.3, there exists (R̂, θ̂) such that
R̂À 0, Span R̂ = SpanR, R̂θ̂ = Rθ and θ̂ = I1RJ .
If we set Ê := (Ec, Êf , Em) where we modify the financial market Ef = (R,Θ•, θ) by Êf =
(R̂,Θ•, θ̂). The auxiliary economy Êf satisfies assumption (PP), (F1) and (F2). Thus, according
to Theorem 2.3, there exists a monetary equilibrium (p, q̂, x•, θ̂•) of Ê .
Since SpanR ⊂ Span R̂, we have the following property:
∀k ∈ J, ∃γ ∈ RJ : R(k) =
∑
j∈J
γ(j)R̂(j)
For every asset k ∈ J , define q(k) = ∑
j∈J
γ(j)q̂(j). If (p, q̂, x•, θ̂•) is a monetary equilibrium of Ê ,
then (p, q, x•, θ•) is a monetary equilibrium of E , with
∀i ∈ I, ∀k ∈ J, θi(k) =
∑
j∈J
γ(j)θ̂i(j).
Recalling the price levels properties for (p, q̂), we have ‖p(s)‖ = c(s), whereas we do not know
anything on first period price levels ‖p(0)‖+ ‖q‖. 
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